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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a person who suffers what she believes is a violation of her
constitutional rights due to the enforcement of a law that was enacted
decades ago. May she challenge the facial constitutionality of this law,
or does the statute of limitations confine her to an as-applied challenge
only? There appears now to be considerable uncertainty among the bar
and on the bench about this apparently simple question, and many
practitioners and judges have come to the erroneous conclusion that
facial challenges to the validity of laws must either be filed within a
certain time frame after a challenged law is enacted or be barred by the
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statute of limitations.1 This error—which springs largely from an
unfortunate overlap with regulatory takings law, itself the victim of
much procedural confusion—has led courts into such mistakes as saying
that statutes of limitations do not apply to First Amendment cases2 or
recharacterizing cases in which laws were found facially invalid as asapplied challenges.3 Worst of all, it has given many practitioners the
misimpression that a facial challenge is time-barred one or two years
after a challenged statute is enacted. This is not correct.
My purpose here is to separate out the different conceptual
categories whose overlap has led to these mistakes. In brief, the
facial/as-applied distinction has nothing to do with the accrual or
ripeness of a cause of action challenging the constitutionality of a law.
The accrual date of facial and as-applied challenges is identical (with
some exceptions, as we shall see), and mere enactment is rarely, if ever,
the ripening event or the moment of accrual for a case in which a party
mounts a facial challenge to a law. The distinction between facial and
as-applied challenges is, so to speak, substantive rather than formal; that
distinction only characterizes the merits of a constitutional challenge.
But that distinction has no relation to jurisdictional questions such as
accrual, ripeness, or statutes of limitations. A plaintiff may challenge a
law’s validity at any time within the limitations period after that law has
injured her, whether she chooses to argue that the law is facially
unconstitutional or only unconstitutional as applied in her case.4

1. See, e.g., Coral Constr. v. San Francisco, 116 Cal. App. 4th 6, 27 (Cal. App. 1st Dist.
2004), review granted, 167 P.3d 25 (Cal. 2007) (“[Party arguing that] facial challenge to an
ordinance accrues when the ordinance is adopted.”); Chuck & Sons Towing, Inc., v. Town of
Smithfield, No. PC-06-2530, at 6 (R.I. Sup. Ct. Feb. 22, 2007) (“[W]hen making a constitutional
challenge based on facial validity, the statute of limitations begins to run upon the enactment of the
challenged provision.”); City of Dallas v. Lowenberg, 144 S.W.3d 46, 49 (Tex. App. 2004), rev’d
168 S.W.3d 800 (Tex. 2005) (“In a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance,
the statute of limitations begins to run upon the passage of the statute or the ordinance, with few
exceptions not applicable here.”). In SMDFund, Inc., v. Fort Wayne-Allen County Airport Auth.,
(No. 02C01-0302-PL-12) (Allen County Cir. Ct. June 28, 2004), the trial court found a facial
challenge time-barred because “A facial challenge is a claim that the ‘mere enactment’ of a statute
is unconstitutional,” id. at 3, but the appellate court affirmed on laches grounds, not statute of
limitations grounds. SMDFund, Inc. v. Fort Wayne-Allen County Airport Auth., 831 N.E.2d 725
(Ind. 2005).
2. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 955 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing cases); Frye v.
City of Kannapolis, 109 F. Supp. 2d 436, 439 (M.D.N.C. 1999); Lamar Whiteco Outdoor Corp. v.
City of W. Chicago, 823 N.E.2d 610, 621 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 2005).
3. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders of U.S. v. City of Los Angeles, 1997 WL
312604, at * 2 (9th Cir. 1997).
4. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing,
113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1324 (2000) (“[T]here is no single distinctive category of facial, as
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II. THE FACIAL/AS-APPLIED DISTINCTION DOES NOT RELATE TO
JURISDICTIONAL PREREQUISITES
The distinction between facial and as-applied challenges is the
focus of considerable scholarly controversy.5 Conceptualizing how
these two categories differ, and what courts are actually doing when
using these terms, is not easy. Nor is the history of the distinction clear.6
But whatever the outcome of these debates might eventually be, the
facial/as-applied distinction is a way of categorizing the type of alleged
constitutional violation. A plaintiff who argues that a law is facially
invalid is claiming that the law is not, and never can be, applied in a way
that satisfies constitutional restrictions. This is a claim that some
fundamental flaw renders the challenged law inherently unconstitutional,
regardless of factual circumstances of a particular case.7 An as-applied
challenge, by contrast, holds that while some circumstances may exist in
which the challenged law is within constitutional boundaries, something
special about this case has caused it to exceed those bounds.8 As

opposed to as-applied, litigation. Rather, all challenges to statutes arise when a particular litigant
claims that a statute cannot be enforced against her.”).
5. See, e.g., David L. Franklin, Facial Challenges, Legislative Purpose, and the Commerce
Clause, 92 IOWA L. REV. 41, 54 (2006) (citing examples of scholarly debate surrounding facial/asapplied distinction); Fallon, supra note 4; Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal
Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235 (1994).
6. The facial/as-applied distinction appears to have evolved as a part of the “overbreadth”
challenge in First Amendment cases, see Anthony M. Barlow, Note: First Amendment Protection of
Free Press and Expression: State Licensing Laws for Newspaper Vending Machines, 58 U. CIN. L.
REV. 285, 286-289 (1990), which allows a litigant to argue that a law violates the free speech rights
of others, even if the law is valid in her own case—something which she would lack standing to do
outside of the context of the First Amendment. See, e.g., Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,
452-53 (1938). The overbreadth doctrine reflects the “preferred position” of “the freedoms of the
First Amendment,” Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948), which position was an outgrowth
of the New Deal jurisprudential revolution. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
NEW DEAL CH. 5 (2000). Since that period, the distinction has grown beyond the First Amendment
context. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 743-46 (1987).
7. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745. Facial invalidity means “that no set of circumstances exists
under which the Act would be valid.” Id.
8. See, e.g., Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 9 Cal. 4th 1069, 1084 (Cal. 1995) (explaining
distinction between facial and as-applied challenges). There is an intriguing parallel here with the
distinction between necessary and synthetic truths in Humean or Kantian epistemology. Cf.
WALLACE I. MATSON, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 341-42 (1968); 2 WILHELM WINDELBAND, A
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 532-67 (New York: Harper & Brothers 1958) (1901). A facial challenge
might be characterized as an argument that a law is a necessary constitutional violation, while an asapplied challenge contends that the unconstitutionality is synthetic. This parallel is further
suggested by the Salerno Court’s reference to “categorical imperative[s]” in analyzing a facial
challenge. 481 U.S. at 748. The shortcomings of this conception of philosophical truth—see, e.g.,
Leonard Peikoff, The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy (1967) reprinted in AYN RAND, INTRODUCTION
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Richard Fallon has noted, facial challenges “are not sharply categorically
distinct from as-applied challenges.”9 Rather, the terms “facial” and “as
applied” simply describe different kinds of arguments on the merits.
With the possibly confusing exception of a relationship between
third party standing and facial unconstitutionality,10 it is at least clear

TO OBJECTIVIST EPISTEMOLOGY 88-121 (2d ed. 1990)—might be responsible for the puzzles and
paradoxes that appear when one investigates the facial/as-applied distinction in greater depth.
9. Fallon, supra note 4, at 1336.
10. Third-party standing cases are a possible source of confusion regarding the timing of a
facial challenge, and, given the complexity of third-party standing, we may be excused for putting it
to one side and addressing here only the typical facial challenge brought by a plaintiff on her own
behalf. But some brief comments on third party facial cases are in order.
This kind of case originates in an overlap between the facial/as-applied distinction and
its parent concept of overbreadth. Overbreadth allows a plaintiff to allege that a law, though
constitutional in her own case, should nevertheless be found invalid because it would infringe on the
constitutional rights someone else. See, e.g., Secretary of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467
U.S. 947, 957 (1984). This is one kind of prudential third-party standing, which allows one person
to assert the rights of another, most commonly allowed in the First Amendment context. See
Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 128-30 (2004). Although the Supreme Court has usually found
third-party standing improper due to the jurisdictional requirements imposed by Article III of the
Constitution, there are cases outside the First Amendment in which such standing is allowed. Id. at
129-30. See also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004) (“The standing
requirement is born partly of ‘“an idea, which is more than an intuition but less than a rigorous and
explicit theory, about the constitutional and prudential limits to the powers of an unelected,
unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government.”’”). A plaintiff who is granted third-party
standing will typically argue a law is unconstitutional regardless of the fact that her particular rights
are not violated. But she might argue either that the law is facially unconstitutional or
unconstitutional as-applied. Family members, for example, often have third party standing to assert
the rights of other family members, and a parent might argue either that a law is unconstitutional as
applied to her child, or that the law is unconstitutional in every circumstance. See, e.g., Hodel v.
Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 711-12 (1987) (children had third party standing to assert rights of deceased
parents); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (parent arguing on behalf of child, and in
vain, that law was facially unconstitutional).
Likewise, a doctor who challenges the
constitutionality of an abortion restriction may assert the rights of her patients, and argue that the
law is facially unconstitutional. See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-18 (1976).
The frequency of this kind of case has sown confusion between the concepts of standing
and facial unconstitutionality. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 80 n.3 (1999)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[F]acial challenge is a species of third-party standing.”). But these two
have little to do with each other outside the context of third-party constitutional claims, and even in
that context they are not identical. See Fallon, supra note 4, at 1359 (“There is indeed an underlying
affinity between doctrines that invite facial challenges (such as the First Amendment ‘overbreadth’
test) and third-party standing doctrines, but only one that is exceedingly abstract: Both are governed
by rules reflecting judicial judgments about the doctrinal structure that is appropriate to achieve
effective implementation of constitutional norms and not about the moral deserts of particular
litigants.”). In third-party cases, the litigant may assert the facial unconstitutionality of a law which
is not unconstitutional in her own case, but she must still have standing to do so. That standing is
not conferred by her mere allegation of facial unconstitutionality, since Article III forbids that, but is
conferred by her close relationship to the party who has been affected by the alleged
unconstitutionality. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 413 (1991). Instead, it is conferred by the
government taking some act which affects her rights and by which her cause of action accrues. A
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that the facial/as-applied distinction categorizes only the nature of the
alleged constitutional violation and has nothing to do with jurisdictional
limits such as ripeness, accrual, statutes of limitations, or, in the case in
which a plaintiff asserts her own rights, with standing. These threshold
jurisdictional concepts are tools for determining whether the court has
authority to hear a case, not whether the law is or is not inherently
constitutional, or constitutional in some cases and unconstitutional in
others. “Under Article III, a federal court must always begin a case,
framed by the concrete facts including an allegation of harm to a specific
plaintiff caused by an identified defendant.”11 A plaintiff who brings a
constitutional challenge must first demonstrate standing (third party or
otherwise), and then argue on the merits that the law is unconstitutional.
Whether she chooses to argue that it is unconstitutional facially (i.e., in
all cases) or only as-applied (i.e., in some cases and not others) has no
bearing on the standing requirements of Article III.
Both facial and as-applied lawsuits are also subject to other
traditional jurisdictional limits. For example, the statute of limitations
requires a plaintiff to bring her case within a certain period after her
cause of action accrues, and a cause of action accrues when the party
knows or should know of the facts giving rise to the cause of action.12
Thus when a defendant argues that a lawsuit is barred by the statute of
limitations, the question will turn on when the plaintiff’s cause of action
accrued—that is, when the injury was final or “ripe.” The terms
“ripeness” and “accrual of a cause of action” are synonymous in most
(but not all13) cases. A case is ripe when all factors necessary to state a
claim are present—that is, when no further action is necessary to make
the plaintiff’s injury certain. In most cases, the moment of accrual and
ripeness is obvious and simultaneous: it is when the plaintiff’s car
accident happens, or when the plaintiff slips on the banana peel. But in
cases involving administrative decisions, such as a case involving a
government denial of a building permit application, accrual and ripeness
can be complicated. There, a cause of action will accrue when the

facial challenge may then be brought within the limitations period after that act. Thus, third-party
standing cases are consistent with my thesis that facial challenges to a statute do not need to be
brought within a certain time limit after mere enactment.
11. Fallon, supra note 4, at 1336-37.
12. See, e.g., Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 1996).
13. See Jones v. Allen, 483 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1149 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (“[O]nce a claim has
accrued it is necessarily ripe; but the converse, that once a claim is ripe it has necessarily accrued
for statute-of-limitations purposes, need not follow. Where, as here, the plaintiff challenges the
constitutionality of an event that has not yet occurred, the claim may be ripe for adjudication
without having accrued for statute-of-limitations purposes.”)
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plaintiff knows for certain that the objectionable permit requirement will
be applied to her,14 and her case will be ripe when the government
makes its final decision on the permit application and the applicable
administrative appeals have been exhausted.15
Once a plaintiff’s cause of action has accrued, she may file a
lawsuit at any time until the statute of limitations period runs out. And
once a plaintiff is in court, she may then argue whatever theory is
appropriate to her circumstances. In the usual case, whether the plaintiff
chooses to argue that the law which she claims injured her is always
unconstitutional (facial) or that it is unconstitutional only in her
particular case (as-applied) bears no relationship to the question of
accrual, and therefore no relationship to the statute of limitations. As a
jurisdictional matter, she must prove that her case is ripe—that she has
really been injured by that law16—and that she filed suit within the
applicable statute of limitations period after the injury. But the nature of
that injuring incident—or the timing of the ripening event—is not
affected by, and does not affect, her argument as to the law’s validity or
invalidity. That is an entirely separate inquiry. Therefore, to paraphrase
Professor Fallon, all federal litigation is, in a sense, “as-applied” since a
court lacking power to issue advisory opinions can only hear cases in
which a law has been (or will soon be) applied. Once that litigation has
begun, a plaintiff may demonstrate that the law by which she was

14. See, e.g., Norco Const., Inc. v. King County, 801 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1986).
15. Except in cases seeking just compensation for a taking property, a plaintiff bringing suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not required to exhaust her administrative remedies. Compare Patsy v.
Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 501 (1982) (“[E]xhaustion is not a prerequisite to an action under §
1983”), with Williamson County Reg’l. Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 193-94
(1985) (exhaustion is required for cases seeking just compensation for regulatory takings).
16. In a case involving third-party standing, of course, the plaintiff must show that the person
on whose behalf the lawsuit is brought has a ripe case and has been injured in some way by the law.
In some cases, third-party plaintiffs argue that the mere fact that an allegedly unconstitutional law
has been enacted is the injury and thus the moment at which the cause of action accrues. Such
plaintiffs also typically argue that the law is facially unconstitutional. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood
Fed’n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957 (N.D. Cal. 2004). Because such cases are generally
brought immediately upon the enactment of a law, by a party who is not herself injured, see id. at
967, and who argues that the law is unconstitutional in every conceivable circumstance, it can
sometimes look as though the ripeness and standing involved are flimsy. But while precipitate
third-party facial challenges can therefore resemble advisory opinions, they are not. The standing
requirements of Article III forbid federal courts from ever hearing constitutional arguments brought
by individuals who merely think a law is unconstitutional but have no real interest at stake. See
Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 61-62 (1986). Therefore, although prudential standing rules may
be lenient in cases brought immediately upon the passage of a law by plaintiffs alleging the rights of
others, and the factual record sparse, such cases must still satisfy jurisdictional prerequisites,
including standing and ripeness.
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injured is necessarily and in all cases unconstitutional, in which case
“facial invalidation occurs as an outgrowth of as-applied adjudication.”17
Some examples help illustrate these principles. In Lawrence v.
Texas,18 a defendant was prosecuted in 1998 under a law that prohibited
certain types of “deviate” sexual conduct.19 The law was enacted in the
1970s, and most recently amended in 1993, yet the plaintiffs argued that
the law was facially unconstitutional,20 and this argument was affirmed
by the Supreme Court. The defendant was therefore able to advance a
facial challenge on the merits because his injury occurred when he was
arrested under a law he alleged to be unconstitutional. Likewise, in
Brown v. Barry,21 the plaintiff wanted to operate a business shining
shoes and discovered that a law on the books for nearly a century
required him to obtain a special permit to do so. His injury accrued
when he learned of the licensing requirement and the fact that it applied
to him. In his suit for injunctive relief, he was free to argue either that
the law was unconstitutional in all circumstances or that it was
constitutional sometimes but not in his case. Either way, his lawsuit was
timely because it was filed within the limitations period after the cause
of action accrued—that is, after he learned that he would be required to
get the license. And in 3570 East Foothill Blvd., Inc. v. City of
Pasadena,22 a business which was subject to an unconstitutional
ordinance could challenge the ordinance’s facial validity, regardless of
its age, because the case was brought within the statutory period after the
ordinance was applied.
In Travis v. County of Santa Cruz,23 the California Supreme Court
explained the rule precisely. There, the plaintiff attacked a county
zoning ordinance on various grounds. The county argued that the case
was time-barred, but the Court rejected this argument, noting that it was:
not a case in which the plaintiff complains of injury solely from a law’s
enactment. . . . Travis complains of injury arising from, and seeks
relief from . . . the County’s imposition on his second unit permit of
conditions required by the Ordinance. Having brought his action in a

17. Fallon, supra note 4, at 1337.
18. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
19. See generally Berta E. Hernández-Truyol, Querying Lawrence, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1151,
1235-38 (2004).
20. See Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 350 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. 2001) (noting
that Lawrence was arguing that the law was facially unconstitutional).
21. 710 F. Supp. 352 (D.D.C. 1989).
22. 912 F. Supp. 1268 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
23. 33 Cal. 4th 757 (2004).
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timely way after application of the Ordinance to him, Travis may raise
in that action a facial attack on the Ordinance’s validity.24

The facial/as-applied distinction is simply not related to accrual
and, thus, has nothing to do with the statute of limitations. So long as a
party satisfies the jurisdictional prerequisites of Article III, or whatever
other formal requirements apply, she may then proceed to argue that the
law being applied to her is either facially invalid or is invalid only in her
particular case. In no circumstance is a facially unconstitutional law
rendered immune from facial challenges merely by the passage of time
after enactment.25
III. CONFUSIONS BETWEEN FACIAL CHALLENGES AND FACIAL TAKINGS
A. Examples of Confusion
We have seen that a facial challenge is just one type of argument on
the merits that, like an as-applied challenge, can be raised whenever
jurisdictional standards such as standing and ripeness are met; facial
challenges are not subject to different timing or accrual analysis than asapplied challenges. Although this argument seems basic, courts have
occasionally erred by holding that a facial challenge to the
constitutionality of a law is time-barred because the case was filed too
long after the enactment of a law—in other words, that the cause of
action in a facial challenge accrues when the challenged law is adopted.
This is incorrect.
In Lowenberg v. City of Dallas,26 the Texas Supreme Court
recognized that the appellate court erred in this way. The case involved
a Dallas ordinance requiring owners of commercial buildings to pay a
fee and obtain a registration certificate. The city repealed the ordinance
almost exactly a year after enacting it, but the city did not make the
repeal retroactive, and therefore did not refund the fees that had been
paid; moreover, it continued to collect money from owners who had not
paid during the ordinance’s short life.27 Then, three years after the

24. Id. at 768-69 (emphasis added).
25. As Justice Souter observed in Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 746 (2005) (Souter, J.,
dissenting), there are many cases where suing “puts nothing in a plaintiff’s pocket and can take a
great deal out,” and where other influences, such as social ostracism can deter the bringing of a
lawsuit. This is one good reason why lawsuits over constitutional issues, including facial
challenges, should not be barred merely by the passage of time after the enactment of the challenged
law.
26. 168 S.W.3d 800 (Tex. 2005).
27. Lowenberg, 144 S.W.3d. at 48.
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repeal, property owners filed a lawsuit contending that the fees were
unconstitutional and demanding a refund.28 The court of appeals found
that this facial challenge was untimely because “[i]n a facial challenge to
the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance, the statute of limitations
begins to run upon the passage of the statute.”29
On appeal, the Texas Supreme Court reversed.30 The Justices noted
that the court of appeals had relied on cases concerning regulatory
takings, which differed from the challenge at hand.31 The property
owners were not arguing that the fee requirement imposed a regulatory
taking; they were arguing that the fee was unauthorized under other
constitutional provisions. Their injury accrued not when the law was
enacted, but when they were required to pay the fee.32 The trial court
had erred by confusing a challenge to the facial constitutionality of a law
with a takings claim. Outside of the domain of regulatory takings cases,
“a cause of action accrues when a wrong produces an injury.”33 Because
the plaintiffs filed their lawsuit within the statutory period after their
injury, the case was timely.34
Barancik v. County of Marin is an even more prominent example of
an appellate court erroneously concluded that a facial challenge to a law
must be brought within a specific period after the law’s enactment.35
There, the plaintiff brought suit in 1985 against a land-use decision, not
on the grounds that it constituted a regulatory taking, but as a violation
of due process.36 The Ninth Circuit abruptly declared that “Barancik’s
facial challenge is barred by the statute of limitations. The cause of
action accrued either in 1972 or 1975 or, at the latest, 1979”37—years in
which the challenged zoning plans were adopted or amended. But
Barancik was not denied a permit to construct until 1984, meaning his
complaint was filed well within the statutory period after his injury. At
that point, he should have been allowed to challenge the facial validity
of the land-use regulation on due process grounds.

28. Id. In fact, they first filed a lawsuit in federal court, then voluntarily dismissed the case
and filed a case in state court.
29. Id. at 49.
30. Lowenberg, 168 S.W.3d at 802.
31. Id. at 801. Facial takings, as opposed to facial challenges, are discussed infra, section
II.B.
32. Id. (citing Lubbock Co. v. Trammel’s Lubbock Bail Bonds, 80 S.W.3d 580 (Tex. 2002)).
33. Id. at 802.
34. Id.
35. 872 F.2d 834 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 894 (1989).
36. Barancik, 872 F.2d at 836.
37. Id.
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Given that the case involved a land-use decision, it might have been
that the Ninth Circuit was simply construing Barancik’s due process
challenge as a regulatory takings claim; after all, the Ninth Circuit later
declared that a property owner with both due process and takings claims
is generally required to bring only her takings claim, because it is more
specific.38 This rule—which was probably abrogated in the recent case
of Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.39—might have led the court to believe
that Barancik was seeking just compensation for diminution in property
value.40 As explained below, it is common for courts to hold that such
compensation claims do accrue at the time that a challenged law is
enacted. But Barancik was not bringing a takings argument: his claim
was that the zoning law had no rational connection to public health and
safety—i.e., that the law was invalid—not that it worked a
constitutionally valid taking of property for which he deserved
compensation. Thus if the court did construe his case as a takings claim,
it erred by confusing two separate categories of constitutional
arguments; but if it did not, it erred by concluding that Barancik’s facial
due process challenge accrued upon the enactment of the law.
In RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seattle,41 by contrast, the Ninth
Circuit correctly found that a facial challenge was not barred by the mere
passage of time. There, nightclub owners alleged that the city engaged
in an unfair, racially biased campaign to shut down clubs playing rap
music. Along with their allegations of official harassment, they also
contended that the city’s nightclub ordinance was vague and
overbroad.42 The lawsuit was filed five years after the city enacted an
ordinance cracking down on rap clubs, and seven years after the
plaintiffs claimed the harassment began.43 The case was plagued by
significant statutes of limitations problems, but the court of appeals
concluded that the owners’ injury accrued when the city “initiated the
abatement action,”44 which came when the city “informed them of its

38. Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1325-26 (9th Cir. 1996); Macri v. King County,
126 F.3d 1125, 1129 (9th Cir. 1997).
39. 544 U.S. 528 (2005). See Action Apartment Ass’n, Inc. v. Santa Monica Rent Control
Bd., 509 F.3d 1020, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that Armendariz was abrogated by Lingle).
40. This is unclear, given the brevity of the Barancik decision and its failure to cite
applicable authority. Moreover, now that the Supreme Court has made the distinction between due
process and takings claims clearer, the usefulness of the Barancik decision is questionable.
41. 307 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2002).
42. Id. at 1050.
43. Id. at 1054.
44. Id. at 1061.
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decision to prosecute.”45 While some of the city’s actions were therefore
outside the limitations period (thus eliminating some of the as-applied
causes of action) the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal
of one of their claims and also reversed its dismissal of the owners’
facial challenges to the ordinance: “Because the Ordinance was enforced
against appellants within the limitations period, this was error.”46
The brevity of the court’s treatment of this point might obscure the
importance of this conclusion: There is simply no categorical rule that a
law becomes insulated from facial challenge by the mere passage of
time. Accrual is a preliminary jurisdictional question necessary for
getting the plaintiff through the courthouse door. The time at which a
cause of action accrues will differ depending on the facts of the case, but
it will come whenever the plaintiff’s rights are finally and clearly
affected pursuant to the law that she believes is unconstitutional. At that
point, the plaintiff can allege that the challenged law is facially invalid
and/or that it is invalid as applied to her.
B. The Source of Confusion: Takings Versus Challenges
The origin of the misapprehension that a facial challenge cannot be
brought beyond the statutory period after enactment lies in confusion
between two different types of constitutional claims: 1) cases involving
facial challenges to the validity of a law and 2) cases involving facial
regulatory takings claims. The two are quite distinct.47
A facial challenge is the argument that a law is void on its face; that
it is necessarily a violation of the Constitution in any and all
applications.48 The proper remedy in such a case is typically not
compensation but an injunction against enforcement and a declaration
that the law is invalid. Such a challenge does not necessarily allege that
the plaintiff was injured when the law was enacted. Thus, a case
alleging facial unconstitutionality is ripe not simply when the law is
passed but, just like an as-applied challenge, when the government acts
pursuant to that law and adversely affects the plaintiff’s rights. A facial
challenge is just one argument a plaintiff might make after she has been

45. Id. at 1059.
46. Id. at 1063.
47. One example of a case that appears to confuse the language of the two categories is Santa
Monica Beach Ltd. v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 4th 952, 961 (Cal. 1999), where the California
Supreme Court characterized the plaintiff’s “inverse condemnation action”—i.e., regulatory takings
claim—as a “facial challenge.”
48. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745.
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injured by the application of that law; facial challenges are “‘incidents’
of as-applied adjudication.”49
A facially unconstitutional law could conceivably linger on the
books for many years before finally affecting a plaintiff. Imagine, for
instance, a community in which all the citizens are white and in which
an ordinance forbids black persons from voting. That ordinance would
be facially unconstitutional, even though it would not affect any of the
residents. But years later, when a black person moves into that
community and discovers that the law forbids him from voting, he has
suffered an injury, his cause of action accrues, and he may seek redress
by challenging the facial constitutionality of the law. This sort of
situation happens frequently. Recent cases striking down laws against
same-sex marriage found that plaintiffs could challenge the facial
validity of such laws even though they were enacted before many of the
plaintiffs were even born.50 In Sei Fujii v. State, the California Supreme
Court found the Alien Land Law—which barred Asian immigrants from
owning real property in the state—facially invalid, despite the fact that it
was decades old.51 In State v. Palendrano,52 the New Jersey Superior
Court found it facially unconstitutional (indeed, “obnoxious” and
“senseless”53) to prosecute a woman for being a “common scold,” even
though this had been a common law crime since the days of William
Blackstone.
A facial taking, on the other hand, occurs when the enactment of a
challenged law inherently constitutes a taking of property under the Fifth
Amendment, for which the owner is due just compensation. The
Supreme Court has concluded that such an injury generally accrues upon
the passage of the law, and, therefore, the statute of limitations clock
begins to run at the moment of enactment.54 There is good reason to
doubt the propriety of this rule, as Michael Berger has noted: “Why
should one facial invalidity under the Bill of Rights be shielded by
limitations, but not the other? The only explanation is the poor relation

49. Fallon, supra note 4, at 1336.
50. See In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757 (Cal. 2008); Goodridge v. Department of Pub.
Health, 440 Mass. 309 (2003).
51. 38 Cal. 2d 718, 737-38 (Cal. 1952).
52. 293 A.2d 747 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1972).
53. Id. at 752.
54. Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 736 n.10 (1997). See also
Brubaker Amusement Co., Inc. v. United States, 304 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied
sub nom. Penn Triple S v. United States, 538 U.S. 921 (2003).
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status of property-rights protection.”55 Be that as it may, the theory
adopted by many courts is that a facial takings claim is not an argument
for invalidity per se, but rather an argument that the enactment of a law
has diminished the plaintiff’s property value and that the plaintiff is
entitled to compensation at that moment. Thus, in Levald v. City of
Palm Desert,56 the Ninth Circuit described “the differences between a
statute that effects a taking and a statute that inflicts some other kind of
harm” by observing that in facial takings cases, “the basis of a facial
challenge is that the very enactment of the statute has reduced the value
of the property or has affected a transfer of a property interest. This is a
single harm, measurable and compensable when the statute is passed.
Thus, it is not inconsistent to say that different rules adhere in the facial
takings context and other contexts.”57
One objection to this theory of facial takings is that it has the
potential of depriving subsequent purchasers of the right to challenge
restrictions of property rights that took effect prior to purchase, even
though that right has been explicitly recognized by the Supreme Court.58
This confusion indicates the need for further clarification by the
Supreme Court, but it need not detain us here. For our purposes it
suffices that a facial takings claim is not a facial constitutional challenge.
Indeed, a claim for just compensation actually presupposes the
constitutional validity of the law in question, as the Supreme Court made
clear in Lingle v. Chevron USA Inc.59 The normative question of
whether a law is constitutionally legitimate is answered by reference to
the Due Process and Public Use Clauses (among others), not by the Just
Compensation Clause.60 The latter simply says that the government
55. Michael M. Berger, Supreme Bait & Switch: The Ripeness Ruse in Regulatory Takings, 3
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 99, 124 n.104 (2000).
56. 998 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1993).
57. Id. at 688. Accord, Carson Harbor Vill. Ltd. v. City of Carson, 37 F.3d 468, 476 (9th Cir.
1994).
58. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001) (“Were we to accept the State’s
rule, the postenactment transfer of title would absolve the State of its obligation to defend any action
restricting land use, no matter how extreme or unreasonable. A State would be allowed, in effect, to
put an expiration date on the Takings Clause. This ought not to be the rule. Future generations, too,
have a right to challenge unreasonable limitations on the use and value of land.”)
59. 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
60. See id. at 543: “[Questions about a] regulation’s underlying validity…[are] logically prior
to and distinct from the question whether a regulation effects a taking, for the Takings Clause
presupposes that the government has acted in pursuit of a valid public purpose. The Clause
expressly requires compensation where government takes private property ‘for public use.’ It does
not bar government from interfering with property rights, but rather requires compensation ‘in the
event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking.’ Conversely, if a government action
is found to be impermissible—for instance because it fails to meet the ‘public use’ requirement or is
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must pay for an otherwise legitimate taking of property. The Just
Compensation Clause is not a kind of penalty for unconstitutional acts;
rather, it is the second step in a two-part analysis. First, is the restriction
on property rights a legitimate exercise of government authority? If not,
the law is unconstitutional. If so, the government may proceed, so long
as it compensates.61
Two regulatory takings cases from the Ninth Circuit, National
Ass’n of Home Builders of U.S. v. City of Los Angeles62 and Carson
Harbor Village Ltd. v. City of Carson,63 explicitly observe the
distinction between facial challenges and facial takings, but these cases
employ somewhat confusing language. In National Ass’n of Home
Builders, an unpublished case, the plaintiffs challenged a Los Angeles
ordinance imposing certain confiscatory conditions on building permits.
They argued that the conditions did not meet the standards required by
the Supreme Court’s decision in Dolan v. City of Tigard,64 and therefore
that the ordinances incorporating those conditions imposed a regulatory
taking for which they were entitled to just compensation.65 The court
noted that this facial takings claim accrued upon the enactment of the
ordinance, and it distinguished facial takings claims from facial
challenges to the constitutionality of a law.66 But the court’s brief
discussion of the differences between facial takings and facial challenges
included a misleading comment. The plaintiffs had urged the court to
allow their facial challenge to proceed because “the Supreme Court has
considered the constitutionality of statutes scores of years after
enactment, citing Loving v. Commonwealth of Virginia . . . and Brown v.
Board of Educ.”67 But “Loving and Brown,” wrote the court, “involved
so arbitrary as to violate due process—that is the end of the inquiry. No amount of compensation
can authorize such action.” (quoting First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles
County, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987) (emphasis added)). See also Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524
U.S. 498, 545 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]he Takings Clause . . . has not been understood
to be a substantive or absolute limit on the government’s power to act. The Clause operates as a
conditional limitation, permitting the government to do what it wants so long as it pays the charge.
The Clause presupposes what the government intends to do is otherwise constitutional”).
61. This is not to suggest that invalidation is never a proper remedy for a regulatory taking;
in fact, there are probably cases where it is proper. This, too, is a matter of controversy that is
beyond the scope of this paper. See generally Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, Thoughts on
The White River Junction Manifesto: A Reply to The “Gang of Five’s” Views on Just Compensation
for Regulatory Taking of Property, 19 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 685, 703-04 (1986).
62. 1997 WL 312604 (9th Cir. 1997).
63. 37 F.3d 468 (9th Cir. 1994).
64. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
65. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 1997 WL 312604, at * 2.
66. Id.
67. Id. at *3.
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as-applied, not facial constitutional challenges.”68 This is not correct. In
both Loving and Brown, the Supreme Court found the challenged laws to
be facially unconstitutional; that is, the racially discriminatory laws
could in no circumstance be applied in a constitutional manner.69
In fact, the facial/as-applied distinction appears to make little sense
in cases alleging that a statute violates equal protection, since the
argument in such cases is that the statute in question is predicated upon
an unfairly biased legal background.70 In his dissent in the 1985
Cleburne decision, Justice Thurgood Marshall pointed out that “[t]o my
knowledge, the Court has never before treated an equal protection
challenge to a statute on an as-applied basis. When statutes rest on
impermissibly overbroad generalizations, our cases have invalidated the
presumption on its face.”71 Loving and Brown were not as-applied cases,
but facial challenges mounted by plaintiffs who appropriately brought
suit within the limitations period after they themselves were injured.
The Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders decision rightly observed that
neither Loving nor Brown were facial takings claims,72 but by
mischaracterizing those cases as as-applied constitutional challenges, the
court overlooked their real significance: Neither Loving nor Brown were
subject to the special accrual standard that applies to facial takings
claims because they were not takings cases. They were facial
challenges, which are not barred by the mere age of the challenged
statute.
The Carson Harbor court did not make this error. There, the
plaintiffs argued that a land-use regulation effected a taking of their
property without compensation. They brought two different kinds of
takings arguments: first, that the law transferred some of the value of
their property to others, and second, that the law failed to substantially
advance a legitimate state interest as required under Agins v. Tiburon.73
The court concluded that their injury occurred upon the enactment of the
68. Id.
69. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“There can be no doubt that restricting the
freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause.”); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“Separate educational
facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated
for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived
of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
70. Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule
Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 359, 431 n.319 (1998).
71. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 476 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
72. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 1997 WL 312604, at *3.
73. 37 F.3d at 473 (citing Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
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law, because “[b]oth facial claims necessarily rest on the premise that an
interest in property was taken from all mobile home property owners
upon the statute’s enactment.”74 This conclusion is consistent with the
facial takings rule.
Nevertheless, Carson Harbor included two important
misconceptions. First, the plaintiffs there brought both a facial takings
claim and a facial challenge. They argued not only that the law took
their property for public use, but also that the law was constitutionally
invalid because it failed to substantially advance a legitimate state
interest. At the time Carson Harbor was decided, the “substantial
advancement” theory was seen as a takings claim, which may explain
the court’s decision, but the Supreme Court has since declared that this
is a due process, and not a takings theory,75 and the Carson Harbor court
itself seemed to anticipate this, commenting in a footnote that “[w]hen
the effects of a regulation do not ‘substantially advance a legitimate state
interest,’ compensation is not automatically due. Rather, the proper
remedy for an invalid exercise of the police power is amendment or
withdrawal of the regulation and, if authorized and appropriate,
damages.”76 If the plaintiffs were bringing a due process claim, their
injury did not accrue at the time the statute was enacted, but instead at
the time when their rights were affected by the statute.
Secondly, and relatedly, the Carson Harbor court concluded that,
under the rule requiring facial takings claims to be brought within a
certain period of the enactment of the challenged law, “[a] landowner
who purchase[s] land after an alleged taking cannot avail himself of the
Just Compensation Clause because he has suffered no injury.”77 This
conclusion is consistent with the decisions of many courts, but
significant doubt was cast on it by the Supreme Court’s subsequent
conclusion in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,78 stating that “[f]uture
generations, too, have a right to challenge unreasonable limitations on
the use and value of land.”79 In Palazzolo, the Court held that the mere
passage of time cannot insulate a land-use regulation from the Fifth
Amendment’s compensation requirement.80 But whatever the proper

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 476.
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543.
Carson Harbor, 37 F.3d at 473 n.4.
Id. at 476.
533 U.S. 606 (2001).
Id. at 627. See also Travis, 33 Cal.4th at 770-71.
533 U.S. at 630.
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time limits for facial takings claims might be after Palazzolo81 is
irrelevant to the question of when facial challenges accrue. If anything,
Palazzolo moves the facial takings rule in the direction of the facial
challenges rule, not the other way around.
To see how the confusion between the timing of facial takings and
facial challenges operates in practice, consider Coral Construction v.
San Francisco,82 in which a plaintiff argued that a San Francisco
ordinance violated the California Constitution by granting certain
preferences to public contractors based on the contractor’s race. The
trial court granted summary judgment for the city on the grounds that the
plaintiff, Coral, lacked standing.83 On appeal, the city argued that the
court should affirm this dismissal on other grounds as well: namely, the
complaint ought to have been construed as a facial challenge to the city’s
contracting policies, and any facial challenge was barred by the statute
of limitations.84 “The statute of limitations for asserting an infringement
of constitutional rights is one year,” the city argued. “And because
Coral’s challenge was a facial one, Coral’s cause of action accrued on
the date that the ordinance became effective.”85 The court of appeals
found that the case was actually an as-applied rather than a facial
challenge, and therefore it did not address this argument,86 but it is worth
considering as an example of the deleterious effects of confusing facial
challenges with facial takings for statute of limitations purposes.87

81. Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion suggested that the timing of a land-use regulation
will continue to affect a court’s consideration of a taking. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 632-33
(O’Connor, J., concurring). In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002), the Court strongly suggested that her less precise formulation would
govern in future cases. See id. at 335-37. See further J. David Breemer & R.S. Radford, The
(Less?) Murky Doctrine of Investment-Backed Expectations After Palazzolo, and the Lower Courts’
Disturbing Insistence on Wallowing in the Pre-Palazzolo Muck, 34 SW. U. L. REV. 351 (2005).
82. 116 Cal. App. 4th 6 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 2004), review granted, 167 P.3d 25 (Cal. 2007).
83. Id. at 14.
84. Brief of Respondent, Coral Constr. v. City of San Francisco, No. A101842 (Cal Ct. App.
1st Dist. Div. 4) at 32.
85. Id. at 33.
86. 116 Cal. App. 4th at 27.
87. Other examples include Chuck & Sons Towing, Inc., supra note 1, in which the court
declared that, “when making a constitutional challenge based on facial validity, the statute of
limitations begins to run upon the enactment of the challenged provision.” Id. at 6. To support this
conclusion it cited three federal cases: Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945 (9th Cir. 2004); DunnMcCampbell Royalty Interest, Inc. v. Nat’l Park Serv., 112 F.3d 1283 (5th Cir. 1997); and Levald,
Inc. v. City of Palm Desert, 998 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1993); as well as a dissenting opinion in a state
case, L.A. Realty v. Town Council, 698 A.2d 202, 220 (R.I. 1997) (Flanders, J., dissenting). But
Maldonado and Levald were regulatory takings cases and therefore inapplicable, and DunnMcCampbell involved the six-year statutory limitations period on all claims against the United
States, not any jurisdictional rule facial challenge accrue upon the enactment of the challenged law.
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The city cited five cases in support of its claim that facial
challenges to statutes are barred if brought too late after the enactment of
the statute: Alaska Legislative Council v. Babbitt,88 Utility Cost
Management v. Indian Wells Valley Water District,89 Acuna v. Regents
of University of California,90 Hensler v. City of Glendale,91 and Barancik
v. County of Marin.92 Yet none of these cases even remotely stands for
this proposition.93
Babbitt and Utility Cost Management both involved specific
statutes limiting particular kinds of actions. Babbitt involved the
statutory six-year jurisdictional time limit imposed by 28 U.S.C. §
2401(a) on all damages claims against the United States94; Utility Cost
Management found a case was filed too late under the California
Mitigation Fee Act—specifically, because section 66022 of the
California Government Code requires any challenge to the imposition of
a “fee or service charge” to be brought within 120 days of its imposition.
These cases neither dealt with common law statutes of limitations, nor
declared that a plaintiff must bring a facial challenge to a law within a
certain period after its enactment. Neither do Acuna, Hensler, or
Barancik. Acuna was not a facial challenge in the first place, but a suit
by a college professor who alleged that he was denied tenure because of
his political views.95 The court found that his cause of action accrued
when his tenure application was rejected—a routine ripeness analysis.96

The dissent in L.A. Realty, which was also a regulatory takings case, simply never addresses the
statute of limitations at all. Nevertheless, the Chuck & Sons court went on to find that the case was
time-barred for other reasons as well, therefore making its conclusion on this point technically
dictum.
88. 15 F. Supp. 2d 19 (D.D.C. 1998).
89. 26 Cal. 4th 1185 (2001)
90. 56 Cal. App. 4th 639 (1997)
91. 8 Cal. 4th 1 (1994)
92. 872 F.2d 834 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 894 (1989).
93. The city also cited Cal. Civ. Pro. § 340(3), which applies to damages actions. Since
Coral was in part a damages action, this provision was arguably applicable, but it has nothing to do
with facial constitutionality arguments. That statute merely applies to cases against the government
seeking damages.
94. 15 F. Supp. 2d at 24. Statutes of limitations are divided into two categories: jurisdictional
time limits by which courts are divested of jurisdiction after a certain time period and the traditional
common law statute of limitations, which is a matter of repose for stale claims. See Wood-Ivey Sys.
Corp. v. United States, 4 F.3d 961, 965 (4th Cir. 1993). It is exceedingly confusing that the term
“statute of limitations” implies that the limit is statutory, when in fact it is not; a statute of
limitations is a common law principle subject to such prudential constructions as equitable tolling.
Id. at 966. But an actual statute, like 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a), is not a “statute of limitations”; it is a
statutory jurisdictional time limit which a court lacks power to alter. See Wood-Ivey, 4 F.3d at 965.
95. 56 Cal. App. 4th at 644.
96. Id. at 647.
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Hensler was a regulatory takings case, and therefore subject to the
special rule discussed above for facial takings claims.97 And, as we have
seen, Barancik was either a regulatory takings case, or a wrongly
decided substantive due process case.
Thus, although Coral was not bringing a facial challenge, it could
have, contrary to the city’s argument. The argument that a law is
facially invalid simply does not expire due to the passage of time after
enactment of that law. Instead, once a plaintiff is injured by the
application of a law,98 she may challenge it at any time within the
limitations period. She is not limited to arguing that the law is invalid as
applied to her. Until the statute of limitations expires, she may challenge
the statute either on the grounds that it is not and can never be
constitutional (facially invalid) or on the grounds that it is constitutional
sometimes but not in her particular case (invalid as-applied).
C. Other Potentially Confusing Cases
There are some unusual cases in which a cause of action other than
a takings claim will accrue upon the mere enactment of a law. This
occurs in the rare circumstance in which a person is injured by the legal
change itself, as when a law repeals a benefit to which a person is
entitled. For example, in Waltower v. Kaiser,99 a convict challenged the
constitutionality of a state law that eliminated a program under which he
would have been eligible for early parole. The Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals found that the case was filed too late because the statute of
limitations began to run on the adoption of the repeal.100 “As a general
rule,” the court noted, “‘a cause of action accrues when all events
necessary to state a claim have occurred.’ With regard to Mr.
Waltower’s facial challenge, all events necessary to state a claim
occurred when the Act became effective.”101 The court did not find that
facial challenges are inherently due within a certain period after the
enactment of a challenged law; on the contrary, Waltower’s right to

97. 8 Cal. 4th at 22 (“If the challenge is to the facial validity of a land-use regulation, the
statute of limitations runs from the date the statute becomes effective.”). Hensler also involved a
statute, Cal. Gov. Code § 65009, which expressly declares that challenges to amendments to zoning
ordinances must be brought within 120 days of the enactment of the amendment. 8 Cal. 4th at 22
n.10.
98. There are some rare cases in which a plaintiff is injured due to mere enactment. See infra,
Section II.C.
99. 17 F. App’x. 738 (10th Cir. 2001).
100. Id. at 740.
101. Id. (quoting United States v. Hess, 194 F.3d 1164, 1175 (10th Cir. 1999)).
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participate in the parole program was wholly eliminated when the law
became effective. Thus, no further facts or incidents were necessary to
develop his injury; that injury was complete upon enactment.
Likewise, in Catawba Indian Tribe of South Carolina v. United
States,102 an Indian tribe brought suit for compensation after a federal
law subjected the tribe to state adverse possession laws, allowing
individuals to take title to some of the tribe’s land. The court found that
the case was brought too late because the tribe’s injury occurred at one
of two moments: either when the statute had been enacted (and not, as
the tribe argued, when a court interpreted the law as applying to the
tribe103), or at “the end rather than the beginning of the ten-year adverse
possession period.”104 In either case, the challenge was brought too late.
Although the court did not decide which was the proper accrual
date, the first option is consistent with the Waltower court’s holding that,
when a plaintiff is directly injured by a change in the legal background
itself, that injury is the moment a cause of action accrues.105 Neither
case stands for the proposition that the injury in a facial challenge
necessarily accrues when the challenged law is enacted. Instead, under
the circumstances of those cases—in which legislation fundamentally
altered the legal background in which a party claimed a vested right—
the injury happened to occur upon enactment.
Finally, challenges to the validity of federal regulations also make
up an area of potential confusion. Congress has by statute established a
six-year limitations period on all actions against the United States,106 and
courts have repeatedly declared that facial challenges to the validity of
federal regulations must consequently be brought within six years of the
moment when these regulations are first published in the Federal
Register.107 This might mislead a person into concluding that, six years

102. 982 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
103. Id. at 1570 (“While the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in 1986 might be relevant to
fixing the time when the Tribe subjectively first knew what the Act meant, it is fundamental
jurisprudence that the Act’s objective meaning and effect were fixed when the Act was adopted.
Any later judicial pronouncements simply explain, but do not create, the operative effect.”)
104. Id. at 1571.
105. Id. (“At that time, possessors of the tribal lands holding under deeds from the State of
South Carolina could begin to acquire adverse possession rights against the Tribe . . . . Any suit
based on the theories presented necessarily would have to have been filed [within the limitations
period of this incident].”)
106. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (2000).
107. See, e.g., Wind River Mining Corp. v. United States, 946 F.2d 710, 713-16 (9th Cir.
1991) (explaining six-year limitations rule for federal regulations); Dunn-McCampbell Royalty
Interest, Inc. v. National Park Serv., 112 F.3d 1283, 1287 (5th Cir. 1997) (“On a facial challenge to
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after publication, regulations are immune from facial challenge. But that
is incorrect, as a closer examination of the cases reveals. Publication of
a regulation is deemed the moment of accrual only to those parties who
are subject to the rule at that time.108 It is not and cannot be an injury to
a party who is not at that time subject to the rule—for example, a
business founded more than a half-dozen years after the initial
publication of the challenged regulation. For such a plaintiff, the injury,
as is true of any other case, accrues when the plaintiff is made aware (or
should know) that the rule will apply. At that point, the plaintiff is free
to challenge the validity of the regulation either as applied or facially—
that is, the plaintiff can argue that the regulation can in no sense be valid,
or that it might be valid in other cases, but not in the case at bar. The
rule governing facial challenges to federal regulation is therefore entirely
consistent with the position defended here: that accrual is unaffected by
the plaintiff’s choice between a facial or an as-applied theory.
IV. REPOSE, PREFERRED RIGHTS, AND OTHER CONFUSIONS
A. Is The Statute of Limitations Applicable to First Amendment Cases?
It is unfortunately common for the law to remedy an old error by
adopting new ones. That appears to be happening as a result of
confusions arising from the timing of facial and as-applied challenges in
the context of the First Amendment. The confusion has led some courts
into the misimpression that the statute of limitations simply does not
apply to First Amendment cases.109 This is incorrect. But because many
First Amendment lawsuits involving statute of limitations arguments
have been brought as challenges to land-use regulations that affect
expressive rights, the rule applied in regulatory takings cases has
sometimes been conflated with the rules applicable to other kinds of
a regulation, the limitations period begins to run when the agency publishes the regulation in the
Federal Register.”).
108. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm., 666 F.2d
595, 602-03 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“‘[T]hose who have had the opportunity to challenge general rules
should not later be heard to complain of their invalidity on grounds fully known them at the time of
their issuance.’” quoting Outward Cont’l N. Pac. Freight Conference v. Federal Martime Comm’n,
385 F.2d 981, 982-83 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (emphasis added)); Wind River, 946 F.2d at 716 (“[A]
substantive challenge to an agency decision alleging lack of agency authority may be brought within
six years of the agency’s application of that decision to the specific challenger.” (emphasis added)).
109. Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 955 (9th Cir. 2004); Nat’l Adver. Co. v. City of
Raleigh, 947 F.2d 1158, 1168 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 931 (1992). The Maldonado
court noted that several district courts have actually held that the statute of limitations cannot apply
to First Amendment challenges, but no federal appellate court appears to have done so. Maldonado
and National Advertising both expressed “doubts” on the question but did not rule on the question.
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cases. This has led trial courts to sense the need for a saving rule, and
they have seized on the preferred nature of expressive rights, concluding
that facial First Amendment challenges are exempt from statutes of
limitations when they are not.
Perhaps the clearest example of this is Santa Fe Springs Realty
Corp. v. City of Westminster,110 in which the owner of an adult cabaret
challenged the facial validity of a zoning ordinance restricting adult
businesses. The district court rightly “refuse[d] to apply the rule
applicable in takings cases” because the plaintiff was arguing that the
ordinance resulted in “a continuing injury based upon [its] on-going
effect on protected speech.”111 As in other “continuing injury” cases,112
therefore, the lawsuit was timely because it was filed within the
limitations period after the plaintiff’s rights were violated. The district
court went on to note that, given the desirability of facial challenges in
many cases alleging First Amendment violations, it was doubtful
whether a statute of limitations could apply at all to such laws.113
Similarly, in 3570 East Foothill Blvd.,114 the plaintiff alleged the
facial invalidity of zoning laws which placed certain limits on the live
dancing that could be offered in clubs and restaurants. The city argued
that the facial challenge was time-barred because the one-year statute of
limitations began to run when the restriction was passed.115 The district
court was not convinced that the enactment of the law was the moment
when the plaintiff’s cause of action accrued: “In support of this
argument, the City cites several takings cases, but no cases in the First
Amendment context,” it noted.116 This was true, but the inapplicability
of those cases did not turn on their First Amendment nature. Rather,
those cases did not apply because the ordinance “inflict[ed] a continuing
harm” which “continues until the statute is either repealed or
invalidated,”117 as opposed to inflicting a single harm through an
immediate confiscation of property, which is the reason behind the facial
110. 906 F. Supp. 1341 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
111. Id. at 1364.
112. The “continuing injury” doctrine holds that when a plaintiff is suffering not a discrete,
particular injury, but an ongoing violation of rights, she may file suit at any time within the
limitations period after the most recent incident. See generally Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115 (2002); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 628
(2007).
113. Santa Fe Springs Realty, 906 F. Supp. at 1364-65 (citing City of Lakewood v. Plain
Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757-59 (1988)).
114. 912 F. Supp. 1268 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
115. Id. at 1278.
116. Id. (citing Levald, 998 F.2d at 688).
117. Id. See also Kannapolis, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 437-38.
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takings rule. The court erred in concluding that facial challenges under
the First Amendment are immune from statute-of-limitations questions.
Instead, the case was a typical non-takings facial challenge to a law that
inflicted a continuing injury; no new First Amendment rule was
necessary.
Santa Fe Springs Realty and 3570 East Foothill Blvd. involved the
continuing injury exception to the statute-of-limitations bar, but the
decisions do not represent any special statute-of-limitations rule for First
Amendment cases. On the contrary, the statute of limitations does apply
to First Amendment cases,118 as is clear when a plaintiff alleges a
discrete, rather than a continuing injury to First Amendment rights. In
Chardon v. Fernandez,119 for example, the plaintiffs alleged that they
had been terminated from their teaching jobs for their political views, in
violation of the First Amendment. The Supreme Court found their cases
barred by the statute of limitations.120 Likewise, in Hobson v. Wilson,121
the Court of Appeals found that the statute of limitations applied to a
lawsuit in which plaintiffs alleged that the FBI violated their First
Amendment rights by conducting surveillance on them. Thus, rather
than establishing some special First Amendment immunity from the
statute of limitations, cases like Santa Fe Springs Realty and 3570 East
Foothill Blvd. are best seen as routine continuing-injury cases, applying
the well-known rule that the statute of limitations will apply differently
when the injury alleged is a “continuing” one.122
While the Ninth Circuit was correct in observing that no circuit
court has yet determined “whether a statute of limitations for § 1983
actions can bar a facial challenge under the First Amendment to a state
statute,”123 it would seem only to increase the doctrinal confusion to
suggest that different kinds of constitutional arguments follow different
accrual rules. Future courts should rely instead on well-established
standards: A party that brings a suit within the limitations period after

118. See, e.g., Baranowski v. Waters, 2008 WL 728366 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2008). The
statute-of-limitations period for civil rights violations has been found to be a procedural, rather than
a jurisdictional, statute, and therefore it can be waived by a defendant, either consciously or through
inaction. Smith v. City of Chicago Heights, 951 F.2d 834, 839 (7th Cir. 1992).
119. 454 U.S. 6 (1981) (per curiam).
120. Id. at 8. See also Muniz-Cabrero v. Ruiz, 23 F.3d 607, 611 (1st Cir. 1994).
121. 737 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
122. Moreover, even in cases involving overbreadth challenges—which might be
characterized as a species of continuing injury case—plaintiffs must demonstrate that they have
been injured in fact. Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 392-93 (1988); Prime
Media, Inc. v. City of Brentwood, 485 F.3d 343, 349-50 (6th Cir. 2007).
123. Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 955.
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her injury has a timely case, and she may argue whatever theory is
appropriate—that the law is unconstitutional as applied or
unconstitutional on its face. Of course, a plaintiff who alleges a
continuing injury will be treated differently than a plaintiff who alleges a
discrete injury, because each incident in a continuing injury resets the
limitations period, and the plaintiff may bring a suit at any time within
the limitations period after the last discrete act.124 But as far as the
statute of limitations is concerned, no special rule distinguishes First
Amendment cases from other theories of facial constitutional invalidity.
B. Repose, Records, And Other Concerns
One possible objection to the proposition that facial challenges do
not automatically expire due to a law’s age is that the law favors a policy
of repose to ensure that constitutional issues are settled and established.
If a person can facially challenge the validity of a longstanding law, this
might cause disruption and uncertainty. There are two answers to this,
one based in policy and the other on precedent. First, there is no
legitimate public interest in keeping facially unconstitutional laws on the
books, no matter how old they might be. As Frederick Douglass said,
nothing is settled which is not right.125 While individuals might form
certain expectations on the basis of facially unconstitutional laws, and
while courts may take such expectations into account, this is relevant
only to the remedy that the court will provide—not to the questions of
the merits or timing of a facial challenge. A court might decide that
although a law is facially unconstitutional, declaring it invalid
immediately will result in unfair surprise to innocent parties and might
tailor its remedy accordingly.126 But it cannot declare that, because a
facially unconstitutional law has been on the books for years, plaintiffs
are barred from alleging that the law is, in fact, facially unconstitutional.
Second, the Supreme Court’s recent pronouncements on facial
challenges indicate that rather than requiring facial challenges to be
brought quickly, the Court actually prefers facial challenges to be
brought after some time has passed, and after the law in question has
been applied and has been subjected to legal analysis by lower courts. In
124. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115 (2002); Heard v. Sheahan, 253
F.3d 316, 318 (7th Cir. 2001).
125. Frederick Douglass, The Meaning of the Fourth of July for The Negro (July 5, 1852)
reprinted in P. FONER & Y. TAYLOR, EDS., FREDERICK DOUGLASS: SELECTED SPEECHES AND
WRITINGS 192 (1999).
126. Cf. In re Archy, 9 Cal. 147, 171 (Cal. 1858) (applying the decision only prospectively, to
avoid surprise).
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Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party,127 the
Court observed that the state had not had an “opportunity to implement”
the challenged law, “and its courts have had no occasion to construe the
law in the context of actual disputes” or to “accord the law a limiting
construction to avoid constitutional questions.”128 The Justices were
therefore reluctant to address its facial validity since “[c]laims of facial
invalidity often rest on speculation” and risk a premature judgment about
the law’s constitutional effect.129 The case does not represent an effort
to grant facially unconstitutional laws any degree of repose, but rather a
desire on the Justices’ part to minimize speculative, potentially advisory
opinions, and thereby to reduce the Court’s interference in democratic
processes.130 Whatever weight these concerns deserve, they do not
suggest that a policy of repose justifies limiting facial challenges to any
specific limitations period subsequent to the enactment of a challenged
law.
A similar concern appears in recent Supreme Court decisions that
have narrowed the availability of facial challenges to statutes.
Unfortunately, one of these decisions has fostered further confusion. In
Gonzales v. Carhart,131 the Court found it improper to entertain a facial
challenge to the constitutionality of the federal partial birth abortion ban,
both because it was inappropriate “to resolve questions of
constitutionality with respect to each potential situation that might
develop,”132 and because the law was “open to a proper as-applied
challenge in a discrete case.”133 This language indicates the Court’s
reluctance to engage in roving constitutional analysis, and it is true that
Article III principles bar the Court from resolving merely potential
controversies or issuing other advisory opinions.134 Yet the Carhart
Court’s reluctance to entertain a facial challenge is confusing, given the
fact that the Court never explicitly questioned whether the parties had
the standing, injury, and redressability required to invoke federal court
jurisdiction. So long as those factors are present, the Court has power to
consider a law’s constitutionality, either facially or as applied. The
Court did have power to entertain the facial challenge in Carhart, and
127. 128 S. Ct. 1184 (2008).
128. Id. at 1190.
129. Id. at 1191.
130.
See Roger Pilon, Foreword: Facial vs. As-Applied Challenges: Does It Matter? 20082009 CATO SUP. CT. REV. vii, ix-xi.
131. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
132. Id. at 168 (emphasis added).
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 700 (1997).
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nearly all of the Court’s abortion cases have involved facial attacks on
abortion restrictions.
But while the dissenters observed that the majority’s rejection of
the facial challenge was “perplexing,”135 even they failed to note that the
majority opinion wrongly suggested that facial challenges and as-applied
challenges are conceptually distinct categories of adjudication, subject to
different jurisdictional prerequisites. They are not; these terms are
simply different ways of characterizing the nature of a law’s
unconstitutionality. If the Carhart Court simply believed it imprudent to
address the question of facial constitutionality without a more fully
established record, or doubted the plaintiffs’ standing, it ought to have
been more explicit in so holding.136 As it stands, Carhart’s language
suggests the wrong conclusion that facial challenges are a different
category of adjudication from as-applied challenges. If uncorrected, that
misconception is bound to wreak havoc on well-established rules of civil
procedure.
Whatever else Carhart stands for, it does not hold that facial
challenges are barred by the passage of time after a law’s enactment. On
the contrary, as in Washington State Grange, the Court simply indicated
a need for more information before adjudicating the constitutionality
arguments, information which would come through the law being
applied in the particular circumstances of a case.137 Indeed, in Crawford
v. Marion County Election Board,138 issued the same term as
Washington State Grange, and only a year after Carhart, the Justices
expressed reluctance to find a law facially invalid “on the basis of the
record that has been made in this litigation”139 and concluded that “the
evidence in the record is not sufficient to support a facial attack on the
validity of the entire statute.”140 Thus, the Court did have authority to
entertain the facial challenge but found that challenge unconvincing.
Carhart’s confusion springs, no doubt, from the preemptive nature of

135. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 187 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
136. The Court was more explicit about the prudential basis of its reluctance to consider a
facial challenge in Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004): “Facial challenges of this sort are
especially to be discouraged. Not only do they invite judgments on fact-poor records, but they entail
a further departure from the norms of adjudication in federal courts: overbreadth challenges call for
relaxing familiar requirements of standing, to allow a determination that the law would be
unconstitutionally applied to different parties and different circumstances from those at hand.” Id.
at 609-10.
137. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 168.
138. 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).
139. Id. at 1623.
140. Id. at 1615.
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that particular lawsuit, and it indicates that, like all constitutional
litigation, facial challenges are more likely to succeed with a robust
evidentiary record and (as required by Article III standing principles)
after a particular plaintiff has demonstrated a particular injury. Facial
challenges remain available in any case in which a plaintiff has been
injured by the application of a law, even an antiquated law.
V. CONCLUSION
A common misconception holds that a facial challenge to the
constitutionality of a law must be brought within a certain period after
the enactment of that law. This is incorrect. Any challenge to a law’s
constitutionality must be brought within the limitations period after the
plaintiff is injured by the law, whenever form that injury might take.
Only very rarely will the injury occur through the mere enactment of the
law. Once injured, a plaintiff can challenge the law’s constitutionality
either facially or as-applied. Facial constitutional challenges should not
be confused with facial takings claims; the latter do accrue upon
enactment, because the enactment is deemed to have “taken” the
property value. But where a facial takings claim seeks compensation for
an otherwise valid law that deprives the owner of property, a facial
constitutional challenge asserts that the targeted law is never
constitutional under any circumstances. The facial/as-applied distinction
therefore characterizes the nature of the arguments on the merits, and
bears no relation to the jurisdictional questions of when a plaintiff has
been injured by the challenged law or when her lawsuit is timely filed.
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